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Note
Connecticut’s Food Waste Problem:
Innovation, Anaerobic Digestion, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
KARA A. ZARCHIN
Connecticut has a food waste problem. Much of its food waste ends up
in landfills where it rots and produces methane gas that contributes to
global warming. This Note examines Connecticut’s efforts to address its
food waste problem through a waste flow control law, Public Act 13-285.
With this law, Connecticut became the first state to pass legislation to
reduce food waste through state-mandated diversion. This Note frames its
discussion of Public Act 13-285 in terms of federal initiatives to cut food
waste and the growing national consensus on the important role for
anaerobic digestion in reducing food waste. This Note argues that in the
absence of a national food waste recycling ban, Public Act 13-285
provides an innovative solution that both reduces food waste and promotes
Connecticut’s anaerobic digestion industry. Connecticut’s law, however,
may be vulnerable to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause,
which protects the belief that one state in its dealings with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation. This Note further argues
that the Dormant Commerce Clause should show deference to state
experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction given the role states
play as innovators and guardians of the environment.
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Connecticut’s Food Waste Problem:
Innovation, Anaerobic Digestion, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
KARA A. ZARCHIN *
INTRODUCTION
In the United States, 30 to 40 percent of the post-harvest food supply is
wasted every year.1 This is $218 billion worth of food that is pitched in the
garbage.2 If this food waste3 were grown in one place, “this mega-farm
would cover roughly 80 million acres, over three-quarters of the state of
California.”4 Globally, “[o]ne-third of the food produced for human
consumption is lost or wasted . . . which amounts to about 1.3 billion tons

* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D., 2018; Bread Loaf School of English, M.A.,
2013; Middlebury College, B.A., in English and History 2006. I would like to thank my family,
especially my husband, Rob Madden, and children, Conor and Laurel Madden, for their continual
support and love and my parents for their encouragement and guidance, always. Special thanks to
Michael Rondon for his friendship and editing advice; Professor Mathilde Cohen for reading an earlier
draft of this Note; Professor Loftus Becker for his insight on the writing process; and my colleagues on
the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful feedback and excellent company.
1
Jon Frandsen, Here’s How States Are Working to Curb Food Waste, PBS (May 16, 2017, 1:49
PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/heres-states-working-curb-food-waste [https://perma.cc/
7JE6-AXMQ]; see also Adam Chandler, Why Americans Lead the World in Food Waste, THE
ATLANTIC (July 15, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/american-foodwaste/491513/ [https://perma.cc/H2PM-4XJU] (“[R]oughly 50 percent of all produce in the United
States is thrown away—some 60 million tons (or $160 billion) worth of produce annually, an amount
constituting ‘one third of all foodstuffs.’”).
2
Fighting Food Waste with Food Rescue, FEEDING AM., http://www.feedingamerica.org/ourwork/our-approach/reduce-food-waste.html [https://perma.cc/JQU8-7QX8] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018);
see Chandler, supra note 1 (“For an American family of four, the average value of discarded produce is
nearly $1,600 annually.”).
3
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations defines food waste as food wasted
in any part of the food supply chain of “edible products going to human consumption.” FOOD & AGRIC.
ORG. OF THE U.N., GLOBAL FOOD LOSSES AND FOOD WASTE 2 (2011),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/mb060e/mb060e.pdf [https://perma.cc/YYV7-9CB5]. But see Roni A.
Neff et al., Wasted Food: U.S. Consumers’ Reported Awareness, Attitudes, and Behaviors, PLOS ONE
10(6): e0127881 2 (2015), http://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0127881 [https://perma.cc/6TZ8WUMU] (arguing, instead, for the use of the expression “wasted food” because “it emphasiz[es] that
the item is essentially food rather than essentially waste”).
4
See REFED, A ROADMAP TO REDUCE U.S. FOOD WASTE BY 20 PERCENT 10 (2016),
http://www.refed.com/downloads/ReFED_Report_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HT5D-UXJV]
(“Growing the food on this wasteful farm would consume all the water used in California, Texas, and
Ohio combined.”).
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5

per year.” At every stage of the supply chain, food waste squanders
resources, including water, land, energy, and labor.6
Food waste is the single largest component of American landfills.7
This rotting food creates so much methane gas that landfills are the thirdlargest source of methane in the United States.8 Methane is twenty-five
times more harmful to the atmosphere than carbon dioxide.9 In response to
the severe impact of food waste on climate change, the United Nations
announced that “[t]he vast amount of food going to landfills makes a
significant contribution to global warming.”10
Connecticut has more food waste in its Municipal Solid Waste
(MSW)11 stream than the national average.12 In 2010, Connecticut’s
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP) published an
inaugural statewide waste characterization study that captured random
samples of waste from residential and industrial/commercial/institutional

5
See Food Loss and Food Waste, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/foodloss-and-food-waste/en/ [https://perma.cc/V62M-CDMJ] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018) (“Food that gets
spilled or spoilt before it reaches its final product or retail stage is called food loss.”).
6
SAVE FOOD: Global Initiative on Food Loss and Waste Reduction, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF
THE U.N., http://www.fao.org/save-food/resources/keyfindings/en/ [https://perma.cc/7DCL-L5FH] (last
visited Dec. 17, 2017); see also Neff et al., supra note 3, at 2 (“Wasted food in North America/Oceania
also accounts for an estimated 35% of freshwater consumption, 31% of cropland, and 30% of fertilizer
usage; as well as 2% of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions; and 21% of post-recycling municipal solid
waste.” (internal citations omitted)).
7
Chandler, supra note 1.
8
See Landfill Methane Outreach Program (LMOP), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/lmop/basic-information-about-landfill-gas [https://perma.cc/8CMY-NEQA] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2017) (“Municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills are the third-largest source of humanrelated methane emissions in the United States, accounting for approximately 15.4 percent of these
emissions in 2015.”).
9
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/
overview-greenhouse-gases#CH4%20referenc [https://perma.cc/UNT3-YETR] (last visited Apr. 22,
2018) (comparing, pound for pound, the comparative impact of methane to carbon dioxide over a 100year period).
10
Id. (emphasis added). Notably, the close link between climate change and resource utilization
“puts food waste squarely at the center of many global challenges” in addition to climate change. Food
waste reduction also “would have a game-changing impact on natural resources depletion and
degradation, food insecurity, [and] national security . . . .” REFED, supra note 4, at 1.
11
Municipal Solid Waste “means solid waste from residential, commercial and industrial sources,
excluding solid waste consisting of significant quantities of hazardous waste . . . land-clearing debris,
demolition debris, biomedical waste, sewage sludge and scrap metal . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-207(24) (2017).
12
Food waste comprises nearly 15 percent of the national MSW stream compared to over 22
percent of Connecticut’s MSW stream. CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., 2015 STATEWIDE
WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY (2016) Figure ES 2-6, http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/
waste_management_and_disposal/Solid_Waste_Management_Plan/CMMS_Final_2015_MSW_Charac
terization_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LPA-CYZA]; Waste-to-Energy (Municipal Solid Waste), U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm/data/index.cfm?page=
biomass_waste_to_energy [https://perma.cc/XEH7-DTT3] (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
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13

generators across the state. In 2015, DEEP replicated this study,
providing for the first time comparative data of the presence of designated
recyclables in the state’s disposed MSW.14 Over this five-year period, the
incidence of food waste in the state nearly doubled from 13.5 to 22.3
percent—both in tonnage and as a percentage of the MSW stream.15 No
other recoverable material in the MSW stream increased so precipitously.16
Simply put, Connecticut has a food waste problem.17
There are solutions to food waste. Multiple stakeholders could help
reduce food waste by changing their behaviors. Indeed, much of the
nation’s food waste is cultural.18 American consumers’ obsession with the
aesthetic quality of their food results in the waste of so-called “ugly” fruit
and vegetables that are rejected because they are bruised or brown.19
Meanwhile, large quantities of fresh produce in the United States are often
left to rot in fields until, like the “ugly” fruits and vegetables, they too find
their way into a landfill.20 This Note examines Connecticut’s innovative
use of an organic waste ban to change the behavior of the state’s
commercial food wholesalers and distributers, industrial food
manufacturers and processors, supermarkets, and resorts and conference
centers.
Part I frames the central concern of this Note—food waste reduction in
Connecticut—in terms of federal initiatives to cut food waste. The nation’s
13

2015 STATEWIDE WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, supra note 12, at ES-1.
Id.
15
In 2010, there were 321,481 tons of food waste in Connecticut’s MSW stream compared to
519,832 tons in 2015. Id. at 3-1 to -6; CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., CONNECTICUT
STATE-WIDE SOLID WASTE COMPOSITION & CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, FINAL REPORT ES-3 (2010),
http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/waste_management_and_disposal/solid_waste/wastecharstudy/ctcomp
ositioncharstudymay2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/TLB8-GZN2].
16
2015 STATEWIDE WASTE CHARACTERIZATION STUDY, supra note 12, at ES-5.
17
There is no clear reason why Connecticut’s food waste has increased in tonnage. Even
Connecticut’s 2015 Statewide Waste Characterization Study, supra note 12, which identifies this
tonnage increase, fails to account for the cause(s) thereof. One contributing factor may be that
consumers do not internalize the environmental costs of food waste. In 2014, researchers at Johns
Hopkins conducted the first ever national survey targeted at understanding consumers’ perceptions
about food waste. Americans report feeling more bothered by letting a faucet drip or leaving the lights
on than by discarding food. When respondents were asked what would motivate them to reduce food
discards, “the most important motivation was saving money.” For 22 percent of respondents,
“environmental concerns of greenhouse gas emissions, energy and water were ‘not at all important’
motivations.” Neff et al., supra note 3, at 1, 7; see, e.g., Brian Dowling, House Calls for Food Scraps?
Meet New Haven’s Biking Compost Man, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 29, 2014, 10:54 AM),
http://www.courant.com/consumer/hc-ls-compost-bike-new-haven-20141029-story.html
[https://perma.cc/PTQ2-YYPM] (reporting how Domingo Medina, the founder of the New Havenbased compost pickup program, Peels & Wheels, believes that Connecticut’s residents do not
internalize the externalities associated with food waste because, while residents pay taxes for municipal
trash removal, they “don’t really pay the true costs of food production and food waste”).
18
Chandler, supra note 1.
19
Id.
20
Id.
14
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food waste problem is readily solvable by Congress if it were so inclined.
Although the United States has pledged to reduce per capita food waste by
half by 2030,21 Congress has not provided the necessary funding for the
infrastructure to process the nation’s food waste. In particular, this Note
focuses on the growing consensus among key stakeholders that food waste
reduction requires investment in anaerobic digestion, which converts food
waste into energy through a process that works much the same way as a
cow’s stomach.22
Part II discusses how, in the absence of a national food waste recycling
ban, Connecticut is one of five states that has passed either a waste ban or
recycling law for food waste.23 Specifically, Connecticut Public Act
13-28524 is a flow control25 law that mandates the recycling of organic
materials—which includes food waste—if the business is within twenty
miles of the nearest authorized recycling facility and produces more than
104 tons of organic materials annually.26 The law’s purpose is twofold: it
both mandates food waste recycling and supports the state’s nascent
anaerobic-digestion industry.
This Note argues in Part III that Connecticut’s organic waste ban may
be vulnerable to challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which
protects the principle that “one state in its dealings with another may not
place itself in a position of economic isolation.”27 But in the face of
Congress’ inaction, this Part argues that there should be deference to state
experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction given the important
role states play as innovators and guardians of the environment.

21
United States 2030 Food Loss & Waste Reduction Goal, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/united-states-2030-food-loss-and-waste-reductiongoal [https://perma.cc/VNQ6-KYVF] (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
22
Mitch Wertlieb & Melody Bodette, Like a Cow’s Stomach Magnified, Methane Digesters Make
Energy, Reduce Waste, VPR (Jan. 28, 2015), http://digital.vpr.net/post/cows-stomach-magnifiedmethane-digesters-make-energy-reduce-waste#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/284Z-ESAQ].
23
Frandsen, supra note 1.
24
Public Act 13-285, 2013 Conn. Acts 254 (Reg. Sess.).
25
See United Haulers Ass’n, v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334
(2007) (“‘Flow control’ ordinances require trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a particular
processing facility.”).
26
This minimum tonnage requirement reduces to 52 tons as of January 1, 2020. The law excepts
those generators “that perform[] composting of source-separated organic materials on site or treat[]
source-separated organ materials via on-site organic treatment equipment.” CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-226e(a)–(b).
27
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
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FEDERAL INITIATIVES TO PREVENT AND REDUCE FOOD WASTE

In recent years, there has been a trend to initiate food waste reduction
goals as a means to end hunger and to address climate change.28 In
September 2015, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced “the first ever
domestic goal to reduce food loss and waste by half by the year 2030.” 29
Mere days after the announcement, the United Nations adopted a similar
goal to reduce per capita food waste by half by the year 2030.30
Though an important step, the United States’ food waste reduction goal
is voluntary. It is an invitation “challenging the country to reduce food
waste.”31 This Part argues, however, that a mere invitation for action is
insufficient where federal financial support, such as tax incentives and loan
funding, is needed for the development of the infrastructure to process food
waste. This Part argues further that the federal government needs to
support the development of anaerobic digestion, a food waste diversion
process that the nation needs to reach its 50 percent diversion goal.
A. Food Recovery Hierarchy Prioritizes Source Reduction Methods
The EPA communicates its prevention and reduction priorities through
its Food Recovery Hierarchy, which essentially promotes a “reduce, reuse,
and recycle” action plan for food waste.32 The Food Recovery Hierarchy
serves as a tool guiding public33 and private actions in this field.34
28
See, e.g., Chris Crowley, The United Nations Wants to Cut Food Waste in Half by 2030,
GRUBSTREET (Sept. 25, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://www.grubstreet.com/2015/09/un-food-waste-goals.html
[https://perma.cc/A6XP-PBYP] (summarizing a recent resolution passed by the UN General Assembly
establishing a goal of “cutting per-capita retail and consumer food waste in half by 2030”); About
Refresh, REFRESH, http://eu-refresh.org/about-refresh [https://perma.cc/C4HX-XCNZ] (last visited
Jan. 8, 2018) (describing the July 2015 launch of “REFRESH” (“Resource Efficient Food and dRink
for the Entire Supply cHain”), a research project to combat food waste funded by the European Union
and supported by twenty-six corporate partners from twelve European countries and China).
29
See United States 2030 Food Loss and Waste Reduction Goal, supra note 21 (“By taking action
on the U.S. 2030 Food Loss and Waste Reduction goal . . . the United States can help feed the hungry,
save money for families and businesses and protect the environment.”).
30
Crowley, supra note 28.
31
Allison Aubrey, It’s Time to Get Serious About Reducing Food Waste, Feds Say, NPR (Sept.
16, 2015, 2:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/09/16/440825159/its-time-to-getserious-about-reducing-food-waste-feds-say [https://perma.cc/R4U3-ZM7M] (quoting then-Secretary
of Agriculture Tom Vilsack).
32
The Food Recovery Hierarchy resembles a reversed six-tiered pyramid with the most preferred
option at the top and the least preferred (landfill/incineration) at the pyramid’s pointy bottom.
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-hierarchy [https://perma.cc/3687V4CV] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
33
See, e.g., H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 503 (requiring that recipients of a loan or grant under § 503
provide “a written commitment that the recipient has read and agrees to comply with the Food
Recovery Hierarchy of the Environmental Protection Agency”).
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Specifically, this seven-tiered hierarchy “prioritizes actions [that are] most
benefi[cial] for the environment, society and the economy.”35 First and
foremost, the EPA encourages businesses and individuals to prevent waste
in the first place.36 The next best outcome, according to the EPA, is to
ensure that surplus food is used to feed the hungry.37 The goal here is to
divert the 30 to 40 percent of all postharvest food supply that is wasted38 to
feed the over 12 percent of American households, or roughly 41 million
people, who are food insecure.39 Congress has long supported the donation
of food that would otherwise go to waste.40
For the food waste that cannot be eliminated altogether, donated to
food banks, or used to feed animals,41 the Food Recovery Hierarchy’s
34

See, e.g., infra Part I.A (discussing how the nonprofit ReFED used the EPA’s Food Recovery
Hierarchy as a starting point in its data analysis of twenty-seven solutions for the nation’s food waste).
35
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, supra note 32.
36
The EPA advises that businesses and individuals can achieve source reduction through simple
managerial decisions like “making grocery lists, inventorying supplies, and buying less.” Additionally,
waste audits that determine “the amount, type, and reason for the generation of wasted food[] . . . will
help to create effective wasted food prevention strategies.” Sustainable Management of Food: How to
Prevent Wasted Food Through Source Reduction, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/how-prevent-wasted-food-through-sourcereduction [https://perma.cc/HM8Q-M5L4] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
37
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Hierarchy, supra note 32.
38
Frandsen, supra note 1.
39
These numbers are based on data from 2016. Sustainable Management of Food: Reduce Wasted
Food by Feeding Hungry People, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainablemanagement-food/reduce-wasted-food-feeding-hungry-people [https://perma.cc/MF5X-7LHJ] (last
visited Jan. 4, 2018); see Matthew P. Rabbitt et al., Understanding the Prevalence, Severity, and
Distribution of Food Insecurity in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV.
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/september/understanding-the-prevalenceseverity-and-distribution-of-food-insecurity-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/FB4P-YVCN]
(defining a person as food insecure if “they had difficulty at some time during the year providing
enough food for all their members because of lack of resources”).
40
See, e.g., Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1791(c) (2012)
(protecting donors from civil and criminal liability with a floor of gross negligence); The Harvard Food
Law and Policy Clinic, America Can Finally Give More: Congress Passes Permanent Extension of
Enhanced Tax Deductions for Food Donations, CTR. FOR HEALTH L. & POL’Y INNOVATION: BLOG
(Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.chlpi.org/america-can-finally-give-more-congress-passes-permanentextension-of-enhanced-tax-deductions-for-food-donations/
[https://perma.cc/D5UX-UWPV]
(describing how, in its 2016 omnibus budget, Congress included a permanent enhanced tax reduction
for food donations available to all businesses).
41
Notably, both state and federal policies frustrate the third tier of the Food Recovery Hierarchy,
which promotes the donation of food waste to feed animals. While federal policy generally permits the
feeding of food scraps to animals, there are rules, such as mandated heating requirements for food
scraps comprised of animal derived byproducts, that hinder waste recycling to animals. U.S. Food
Waste Policy Finder: Connecticut Food Waste Policy, REFED, http://www.refed.com/tools/foodwaste-policy-finder/connecticut [https://perma.cc/JQQ7-Q4TS] (last visited Jan. 8, 2018). Many states
either prohibit the feeding of food waste to animals or impose regulations that are far more stringent
than the floor established by federal law. Kansas and Illinois, for example, prohibit feeding food waste
to all animals. Id. Sixteen states prohibit feeding animal food waste to swine, and thirteen states
regulate the feeding of food scraps to other animals beside swine. Id. Connecticut regulates the feeding
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fourth tier recommends transforming these food scraps into energy through
anaerobic digestion.42 “Anaerobic digestion is the natural process in which
microorganisms break down organic materials” in a closed space without
oxygen.43 This process produces biogas that consists of “mostly methane
and carbon dioxide.”44 When the carbon dioxide is removed, methane—
“the primary component of natural gas”—remains.45 Unlike the methane
gas emitted at landfills, this gas can be sold on the natural gas grid.46
Anaerobic digestion’s ability to convert biomass into energy makes it
the “next big renewable energy source.”47 In this way, anaerobic digestion
is self-sustaining: it converts a community’s waste into energy that the
community then uses for electricity.48 “Closing waste loops and recovering
energy from waste presents a profound opportunity to simultaneously
improve waste management and address climate change,” according to
David Babson, a technology manager at the U.S. Department of Energy’s
Bioenergy Technologies Office.49
There are more than 2000 anaerobic digestion sites in the United
States, but only 40 to 50 of those sites exclusively process food waste.50 In
March 2016, ReFED, a data-driven nonprofit committed to reducing food
waste in the United States,51 used the EPA’s Food Recovery Hierarchy as a
starting point52 in its analysis of the diversion potential of twenty-seven

of food scraps to swine but does not impose regulations that are more stringent than the floor
established by federal law. Id.; see Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 22-320a–g.
42
Sustainable Management of Food: Industrial Uses for Wasted Food, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/industrial-uses-wasted-food
[https://perma.cc/2XEL-XHNB] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018).
43
Basic Information About Anaerobic Digestion (AD), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/anaerobic-digestion/basic-information-about-anaerobic-digestionad#HowADworks [https://perma.cc/GQ58-JYL7] (last visited Dec. 15, 2017).
44
Id.
45
Anaerobic digestion also produces a nutrient-rich fertilizer called digestate, which is a wet
mixture that separates from the biogas during the digestion process. Id.
46
See Sheridan Cyr, Quantum Biopower Hits the Grid; Enters Production Phase, SOUTHINGTON
OBSERVER (Dec. 14, 2017), http://southingtonobserver.com/2017/12/14/quantum-biopower-hits-thegrid-enters-production-phase/ [https://perma.cc/D3Y2-6E82] (discussing how Quantum Biopower, an
anaerobic digestion facility in Southington, Connecticut, will now be providing energy “to the local
grid”).
47
Nathan Hurst, Why Anaerobic Digestion Is Becoming the Next Big Renewable Energy Source,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/why-anaerobicdigestion-becoming-next-big-renewable-energy-source-180960992/ [https://perma.cc/G5FV-6SYW].
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Centralized Anaerobic Digestion (AD), REFED, http://www.refed.com/solutions/centralizedanaerobic-digestion [https://perma.cc/8SWB-HPTL] (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).
51
About ReFED, REFED, http://www.refed.com/about [https://perma.cc/PN23-WWX7] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2018).
52
Food Waste Is a Solvable Problem, REFED, http://www.refed.com/solutions/?sort=diversionpotential [https://perma.cc/KJ7C-HEKH] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).

828

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

53

waste solutions. Centralized anaerobic digestion ranked second for
greatest diversion potential with a 1.9-million ton diversion potential
annually from landfills and on-farm losses,54 second only to centralized
composting.55 While its diversion potential is great, anaerobic digestion is
expensive. Total capital expenditure for a new facility is estimated at $36
million.56 Although the EPA identifies that “[t]here is increasing interest in
finding effective means to obtain biofuel and bio-products from wasted
food,”57 federal law does not specially support the infrastructure
development necessary for the widespread use of anaerobic digestion
facilities.
B. Federal Agencies Promote Voluntary Programs
In order to reach the nation’s 50 percent reduction goal by 2030, the
federal government needs to invest in the solutions identified in the EPA’s
Food Recovery Hierarchy. Instead, the EPA and USDA have placed the
onus on the public through the creation of two voluntary programs.58
First, the EPA has called on schools and businesses to participate in its
U.S. Food Loss and Waste Challenge (the Challenge), a voluntary program
that encourages participants to conduct personal food waste audits, share
best practices, and attain personal reduction goals.59 In 2016, 950
participants and endorsers60 “prevented and diverted over 740,000 tons of
food waste from entering landfills or incinerators.”61 Of that, 85,000 tons
53

Solutions considered included Date Labeling, Consumer Education Campaigns, Donation
Storage and Handling, Donation Matching Software, Donation Transportation, Value-Added
Processing, Donation Liability Education, Safe Donation Regulation, Donation Tax Incentives, Home
Composting, Community Composting, and Water Resources Recovery Facilities with Anaerobic
Digestion. REFED, A ROADMAP TO REDUCE U.S. FOOD WASTE BY 20%: TECHNICAL APPENDIX 3, 21
(March 2016), https://www.refed.com/downloads/ReFED_Technical_Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KKQ8-TXXT].
54
Id. at 48.
55
Centralized composting has a diversion potential of five million tons annually. Id. at 51.
56
This figure is based on the capital costs for a 40,000-ton anaerobic digestion facility, including
equipment for the anaerobic digestion, odor control, gas treatment, and internal combustion engines.
Additionally, it includes costs for engineering and capital costs for composting the digestate. Id. at 53.
57
Sustainable Management of Food: Industrial Uses for Wasted Food, supra note 42.
58
See USDA Food Waste Champions, U.S. DRUG ADMIN., https://www.usda.gov/oce/foodwaste/
Champions/index.htm [https://perma.cc/WQ7R-NX53] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018) (“Government alone
cannot reach this goal. It will require effort and action from the entire food system.”).
59
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Challenge (FRC), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-challenge-frc#how
[https://perma.cc/QYY6-A6MS] (last visited Jan.11, 2018).
60
While participants are involved in the food prevention and reduction that count toward the
program’s results, endorsers are organizations and businesses that promote food sustainability through
education. Connecticut’s DEEP, for example, serves as an active endorser of the EPA’s U.S. Food Loss
and Waste Challenge. Id.
61
Sustainable Management of Food: Food Recovery Challenge Results and Award Winners, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sustainable-management-food/food-recovery-challenge-
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62

of food were anaerobically digested. Second, in November 2016, the
USDA and EPA formed the U.S. Food Loss and Waste 2030 Champions, a
corporate call for action comprised of “businesses and organizations that
have made a public commitment to reduce food loss and waste in their own
operations in the United States by 50 percent by the year 2030.”63
The commitment from corporate America rightly places food waste
prevention and reduction on the national stage.64 The problem, however, is
that these initiatives alone will not help the United States to reach its 50
percent reduction goal by 2030. A 740,000-ton reduction, while
commendable, is a far cry from reaching, say, a 30-million ton reduction
by 2030, which would have been 50 percent of the nation’s total food
waste in 2016.65 The United States also needs a comprehensive wide-scale
plan for the reduction of food waste.66
C. Congress Considers “Bipartisan” Issue
In May 2016, the House Committee on Agriculture held its first
hearing on food waste—an issue that the hearing’s chairman, Republican
Congressman K. Michael Conaway, declared is bipartisan.67 At this
hearing, anaerobic digestion emerged as a key solution for food waste
results-and-award-winners [https://perma.cc/4WQM-3CRJ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). As of January
2018, there were 595 active Challenge participants, including 290 food, drug, and convenience stores;
87 colleges or universities; 85 sports or entertainment venues; 4 government agencies; and 3 local
governments. Id.
62
Id.
63
USDA Food Waste Champions, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., https://www.usda.gov/oce/foodwaste/
Champions/index.htm [https://perma.cc/D4KE-BY7V] (last visited Jan. 4, 2018). Notably, there is
some overlap between participants of the EPA’s Challenge and the EPA and USDA’s Champions,
including Aramark, Wegmans Food Market, and Yum! Brands. Id.; Sustainable Management of Food:
Food Recovery Challenge (FRC), supra note 59.
64
Participants include the Boston Red Sox, Big Y Food, Inc., Dana Farber Cancer Institute,
Denver International Airport, Disneyland Resort, HBO, MGM Resorts International, and Whole Foods
Market, just to name a few. Id.
65
See Chandler, supra note 1 (“[R]oughly 50 percent of all produce in the United States is thrown
away—some 60 million tons (or $160 billion) worth of produce annually, an amount constituting ‘one
third of all foodstuffs.’”).
66
ReFED, “a collaboration of over 30 business, non-profit, foundation, and government leaders
committed to reducing food waste in the United States,” noted in its roadmap for food waste reduction
that “[w]hile some solutions are gaining ground, the United States still lacks a comprehensive action
plan to unleash a wide-scale national reduction in food waste.” REFED, supra note 4, at 2, 10.
67
Food waste is often met with bipartisan support because it is primarily presented as a way to
end hunger, something that everyone wants. Food Waste from Field to Table: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Agric., 114th Cong. 2 (2016) [hereinafter Food Waste] (statement of Rep. K. Michael
Conaway) (“Tackling food waste in this country is, and should be a non-partisan issue that will be most
successful by engaging everyone in the food chain, from the field to the table.”); see also Arthur
Delaney, We Waste So Much Food That Congress Might Actually Do Something, HUFFPOST (July 6,
2016,
10:00
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/food-waste-date-labels-chelliepingree_us_576a8deee4b0c0252e77c263
[https://perma.cc/G43B-Z47D]
(“[R]epublicans
and
Democrats have found something they might be able to agree on: Garbage is bad.”).
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reduction, a solution that also helps to reduce methane generation at
landfills, to create nutrient-filled digestate for the soil, and to produce clean
energy that can be sold for profit.69 Those who testified in support of
anaerobic digestion recognized that the lack of widespread infrastructure
for it in the United States presents a financing hurdle.70 Additionally, for
anaerobic digestion facilities to be successful, infrastructure options must
be “geographically and operationally feasible.”71 This is because the cost
of transporting food waste, which is very wet and dense, to an anaerobic
digestion facility can be cost prohibitive, unless the facility is located close
to the source of waste origin.72
Just over a year later, one of the hearing’s participants, Representative
Chellie Pingree, a Democrat from Maine, whom Chairman Conaway
credited for putting food waste on the Committee of Agriculture’s radar,73
made another big move. On July 27, 2017, Representative Pingree and
Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Democrat from Connecticut, introduced
68
E.g., Food Waste, supra note 67, at 47 (2016) (statements of Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director,
MissionPoint Partners LLC, Norwalk, CT; on behalf of ReFED: Rethink Food Waste Through
Economics and Data; and Meghan B. Stasz, Senior Director, Sustainability, Grocery Manufacturers
Assoc., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Food Waste Reduction Alliance).
Additionally, many testified in support of the standardization of date labels on food. E.g., id. at 7,
18 (statements of Rep. Chellie Pingree; and Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director, MissionPoint Partners
LLC, Norwalk, CT; on behalf of ReFED). There is widespread agreement that date labels, such as “sell
by,” “use by,” and “best before,” confuse consumers, who may then dispose of food unnecessarily.
While “sell by” dates are intended to communicate with grocers as “a tool for stock control,” “use by”
and “best before” dates are more estimates of a product’s peak quality and not when a food will
become unsafe. A report coauthored by the Natural Resources Defense Council and Harvard Law
School’s Food Law and Policy Clinic found that “[m]ore than 90 percent of Americans may be
prematurely tossing food because they misinterpret food labels as indicators of food safety.” New
Report: Food Expiration Date Confusion Causing Up to 90% of Americans to Waste Food, Press
Release, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.nrdc.org/media/2013/130918
[https://perma.cc/MD7K-JC6P]. There are currently no national guidelines for dated food labels, with
the exception of infant formula. Id. The diversion potential of standardizing date labeling is far less
than anaerobic digestion, at roughly 400,000 tons annually. REFED, supra note 53, at 27, 48.
69
Food Waste, supra note 67, at 16 (statement of Dana Gunders, Senior Scientist, Food and
Agriculture, Natural Resources Defense Council).
70
E.g., id.
71
Id. at 47 (statement of Meghan B. Stasz, Senior Director, Sustainability, Grocery Manufacturers
Assoc., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Food Waste Reduction Alliance).
72
See id. (“[F]WRA’s [Food Waste Reduction Alliance] 2014 Assessment found that 70% of
manufacturers, 92% of retailers, 83% of small restaurants and 100% of large restaurants surveyed listed
‘insufficient recycling options’ as their number one barrier to diverting food waste from landfill.”); see
also id. at 31 (statement from Jesse M. Fink, Managing Director, MissionPoint Partners LLC, Norwalk,
CT; on behalf of ReFED: Rethink Food Waste Through Economics and Data) (testifying that (1) siting
facilities near urban centers and optimizing hauling routes are important to ensure a facility’s steady
flow of organic materials; and (2) building facilities in the Northeast, Northwest, and Midwest presents
“the most [e]conomic [v]alue from recycling due to high landfill disposal fees and high compost and
energy market prices”).
73
See id. at 2 (statement of Hon. K. Michael Conaway, Congressman from Texas) (“[I] commend
my colleague from Maine, Chellie Pingree, for putting this on the Congressional radar.”).
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H.R. 3444, the Food Recovery Act of 2017. This landmark bicameral
legislation calls for the reduction of food waste through measures that
“ensure that more of our food is put to use rather than going to waste.”74 In
addition to requiring actions like the standardization of date labeling and
reducing waste in schools by encouraging cafeterias to purchase lower-cost
“ugly” fruit and vegetables,75 the Food Recovery Act would amend the
Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1926(a)(1), in two
significant ways.
First, under the Food Recovery Act, the Consolidated Farm Rural
Development Act would identify, for the first time, composting and
anaerobic digestion as “essential community facilities.”76 This
classification would fortify the United States’ commitment to food waste
reduction by recognizing that these waste disposal methods are vital to our
local communities. Second, under the Food Recovery Act, the
Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act would require that 5 percent of
the funds earmarked for essential community facility funding should be
reserved for loans “for municipal or county composting, anaerobic
digestion food waste-to-energy projects, and the conversion of animal
waste products into industrial products or into raw materials . . . .”77 It also
would make an additional $50 million available annually for loans.78 This
unprecedented access to funding would go a long way toward making it
easier for entities to surmount the financing hurdle that anaerobic digestion
presents.
The passing of the Food Recovery Act would provide critical capital
investment to solutions identified in the EPA’s Food Recovery Hierarchy.
Unfortunately, the Food Recovery Act has not moved out of committee in

74

Press Release, Congresswoman Chellie Pingree 1st District of Maine, Congresswoman Pingree
Introduces Bicameral Food Recovery Act (July 31, 2017), https://pingree.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/congresswoman-pingree-intorduces-bicameral-food-recovery-act
[https://perma.cc/2TB6-PKYT].
75
H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. §§ 401–406, 301–305.
76
H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 502 (2017). Consolidated Farm Rural Development Act, 7 U.S.C. §
1926(a)(1), currently reads:
The Secretary is also authorized to make or insure loans to associations . . . for the
application or establishment of soil conservation practices, shifts in land use, the
conservation, development, use, and control of water, and the installation or
improvement of drainage or waste disposal facilities, recreational developments, and
essential community facilities including necessary related equipment, all primarily
serving farmers, ranchers, farm tenants, farm laborers, rural businesses, and other
rural residents, and to furnish financial assistance or other aid in planning projects
for such purposes.
77

H.R. 3444, 115th Cong. § 502 (2017) (emphasis added).
The $50 million would come from funds allocated to the government-owned Commodity Credit
Corporation. Id.
78
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either the House or Senate. And despite Chairman Conaway’s claim that
food waste is a bipartisan issue, so far Representative Pingree’s twenty-six
cosponsors in the House80 and Senator Blumenthal’s four cosponsors in the
Senate are all Democrats.81 Until Congress passes legislation, it is up to
individual states to ensure that food waste reduction actually happens.82
II.

CONNECTICUT COMMITS TO FOOD WASTE DIVERSION

Well before the United States and the United Nations pledged to
reduce food waste, Connecticut became the first state to pass legislation to
reduce food waste through state-mandated diversion.83 Connecticut’s
79
All Actions Except Amendments H.R. 3444 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3444/all-actions-without-amendments
[https://perma.cc/78WG-7VVJ] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018); All Actions Except Amendments H.R. 3444
— 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
house-bill/3444/all-actions-without-amendments [https://perma.cc/9HM9-KMMR] (last visited Jan. 31,
2018).
80
Cosponsors: H.R. 3444 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3444/cosponsors
[https://perma.cc/Z4N23LR8] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
81
Cosponsors:
S.
1680
—
115th
Congress
(2017–18),
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1680/cosponsors
[https://perma.cc/363SBUVN] (last visited Jan. 31, 2018).
82
Only five states structure their laws as organic waste bans: California, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
42649.81 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 2018 Reg. Sess.) (effective 2016); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (West, Westlaw through the 2017 June Special Sess.) (effective 2014);
Massachusetts, 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 19.017 (West, Westlaw through Reg. No. 1356, Jan. 12, 2018)
(effective 2014); Rhode Island, 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18.9–17 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 480 of the
Jan. 2017 Sess.) (effective 2016); and Vermont, VT. STA. ANN. tit. 10, § 6605k (West, Westlaw
through the 2017 Legis. Sess.) (effective 2014). Four American cities also have city ordinances: New
York City, New York (effective 2015); Portland, Oregon (effective 2014); San Francisco, California
(effective 2009); and Seattle, Washington (effective 2015). U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF
RES. CONSERVATION & RECOVERY, FOOD WASTE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014 9
(2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/food_waste_management_
2014_12082016_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZT9-HZAM]; see generally Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P.
Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep: Adapting the Doctrine to Support State
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 297 (2013) (arguing that the responsibility has
fallen on the states to serve as the “‘laboratories’ for testing various policy mechanism in pursuit of
protecting the environment”).
83
See CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY & ENVTL. PROT., 2016 COMPREHENSIVE MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY: THE CONNECTICUT SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN 9 (2016),
PLAN],
http://www.ct.gov/deep/lib/deep/waste_management_and_disposal/
[hereinafter
THE
Solid_Waste_Management_Plan/CMMS-Final_Adopted_Comprehensive_Materials_Management_
Strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2JZ-XXQR] (citation omitted) (“Connecticut set the stage for
expanding our processing capacity for food scraps and potential for reducing waste burned at the
resources recovery facilities with a first-in-the-nation mandate for commercial organics recycling.”);
Patrick Serfass, Vermont, Now Connecticut, Models for Diverting Organics, BIOMASS MAG. (July 1,
2013),
http://biomassmagazine.com/articles/9153/vermont-now-connecticut-models-for-divertingorganics/ [https://perma.cc/H3FY-X6Q3] (“Connecticut got the ball rolling in October 2011 with the
passage of Public Act 11–217, which required large commercial waste generators . . . to divert food
waste if they were within 20 miles of a licensed facility.”); Nicholas M. Vaz, Comment, Are You
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interest in food waste reduction stemmed from its realization that food
waste was the largest component of its MSW.84 Today, Connecticut is one
of five states that has passed either a waste ban or waste-recycling law for
food waste that restricts entities that generate a specified amount of food
waste from sending this waste to landfills, subject to certain exceptions. 85
These laws are important examples of American federalism: the use of
state-based experimentation to address a pressing national problem.
This Part discusses the widespread belief in Connecticut that anaerobic
digestion will rescue the state from its food waste problem by offering an
environmentally conscious alternative to landfilling with the benefit of
creating jobs and providing a renewable energy source.86 This Part further
argues that Connecticut structured its organic materials recycling law,
Public Act 13-285, to guarantee that there would be product to support the
state’s nascent anaerobic digestion industry.
A. Legislation Creates Organics Recycling Market
In 2011, with the passage of Public Act 11-217, Connecticut did
something that many hailed as “genius.”87 It required large commercial
waste generators producing more than 104 tons of source-separated
materials to divert that waste to a permitted source-separated organicmaterial composting facility if they were within twenty miles of a licensed
facility.88 Source-separated organics means “food waste or yard waste . . .
that can be separated by the waste generator.”89 Connecticut’s requirement,
though, only became effective six months after two licensed facilities
could accept the material.90 This requirement is “what many hail as the
law’s genius.”91 In essence, Connecticut was relying on the market to
Gonna Eat That?: A New Wave of Mandatory Recycling Has Massachusetts and Other New England
States Paving the Way Toward Feasible Food Waste Diversion and a New Player in Alternative
Energy, 26 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 193, 200 (2015) (arguing that Connecticut “paved the way for mandated
diversion of food waste” with its passage of Public Act 11-217).
84
Brenda Platt, Connecticut—Organics Recycling Mandate, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://ilsr.org/rule/food-scrap-ban/Connecticut-organics-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/
9Y9C-6QWT].
85
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF RES. CONSERVATION & RECOVERY, supra note 82.
86
See Jan Ellen Spiegel, Looks Like an Onion Skin, But It Could Be Electricity, CT MIRROR (Apr.
30, 2012), https://ctmirror.org/2012/04/30/looks-onion-skin-it-could-be-electricity/ [https://perma.cc/
N4AG-DKSL] (“Connecticut views anaerobic digester technologies as drivers for green jobs and new
industry, said Diane Duva, assistant director of waste engineering at DEEP.”).
87
Id.
88
2011 Conn. Acts 11-217 (Reg. Sess.).
89
See Serfass, supra note 83; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a–207(30) (defining sourceseparated organic material to “mean[] organic material, including, but not limited to, food scraps, food
processing residue and soiled or unrecyclable paper that has been separated at the point or source of
generation from nonorganic material”).
90
2011 Conn. Acts 11-217 (Reg. Sess.).
91
Spiegel, supra note 86.
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ensure the development of processing facilities for food waste, but once the
facilities were built, the law guaranteed that there would be product to
support them.92 In 2013, Connecticut slightly amended this law with the
passage of Public Act 13-285, which maintained the 104-ton-per-year
starting point for commercial generators and reduced this quota to 52 tons
per year in 2020.93
Public Act 13-285 supports Connecticut’s commitment to achieving
60 percent diversion of solid waste from disposal by 2024.94 Connecticut
has recognized that an increase in organic recycling requires that it have
the infrastructure to handle this increase in processing.95 Specifically,
DEEP has identified the development of anaerobic digestion facilities as
one of the state’s “top growth priorities.”96 Connecticut also views its
investment in anaerobic digester technologies as a “driver[] for green jobs
and new industry.”97 Public Act 13-285, thus, was named aptly An Act
Concerning Recycling and Jobs.98 Studies support Connecticut’s position
that the handling of organics through recycling, as opposed to landfilling,
creates job opportunities.99
With much on the line—addressing the state’s food waste problem,
developing an organics recycling market, and creating green jobs—
Connecticut has supported the state’s development of anaerobic digestion
facilities through the Connecticut Green Bank, the nation’s first green
bank,100 infra Part II.B., and through the triggers in Public Act 13-285, an
organic waste ban that functions as a flow control law that favors in-state
businesses, infra Part II.C.

92

See Serfass, supra note 83 (arguing in support of the sustainability of Connecticut’s model
because it creates a market by “ensur[ing] that if a developer builds a system nearby, they’ll have
organic waste to feed it”). But see, John Turner, The Flow Control of Solid Waste and the Commerce
Clause: Carbone and Its Progeny, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 208 (1996) (“Flow control measures often
result in a significant ‘takings’ issue, if not in the constitutional sense, at least from the standpoint of
fairness. . . . When one jurisdiction establishes flow control, other facilities immediately have current
and potential customer assets pulled away.”).
93
2013 Conn. Acts 13-285 § 4(a)(2) (Reg. Sess.). The law exempts “[a]ny wholesaler, distributer,
manufacturer, processor, supermarket, resort or conference center that performs composting of sourceseparated organic materials on site or treats source-separated organic materials via on-site organic
treatment equipment . . . .” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e(b) (2017).
94
THE PLAN, supra note 83, at 7.
95
Id. at 19.
96
Id.
97
Spiegel, supra note 86.
98
2013 Conn. Acts 13-285 (Reg. Sess.).
99
Spiegel, supra note 86; see, e.g., REFED, supra note 4, at 56 (“For every million tons of
organic matter composted, nearly 1,400 new jobs can be sustained using the finished compost in green
infrastructure.” (citation omitted)).
100
About Us: Changing Connecticut for the Greener, CONN. GREEN BANK,
http://www.ctgreenbank.com/about-us-2017/ [https://perma.cc/RP9L-JE3Q] (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).
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B. The Connecticut Green Bank Provides Funding
In 2011, to promote the development of an anaerobic digestion
industry in Connecticut, Connecticut created the Clean Energy Finance and
Investment Authority (CEFIA) under Public Act 11-80.101 CEFIA would
eventually be given a broader mandate and become the Connecticut Green
Bank.102 The Connecticut Green Bank—the nation’s first green bank—is a
quasi-public company that leverages “limited public dollars to attract
private capital investment in clean energy projects.”103 Since its inception,
Connecticut Green Bank has invested more than $1 billion in the state’s
clean energy.104
Public Act 11-80, Section 103(b) empowered CEFIA to “establish a
three-year pilot program to support through loans, grants or power
purchase agreements sustainable practices and economic prosperity of
Connecticut farms and other businesses by using organic waste with onsite anaerobic digestion facilities to generate electricity and heat.”105
Furthermore, CEFIA was authorized to allocate $2 million annually for
anaerobic digestion projects106 for no more than five projects.107 In 2012,
this pilot program was extended to five years, ending in 2017.108 Quantum
Biopower, Connecticut’s first anaerobic digestion facility in Southington,
for example, received a $2 million lower-interest loan from Connecticut
Green Bank for its $14 million project.109
Notably, Public Act 11-80 also created the Connecticut DEEP by
consolidating the Department of Environmental Protection and Department
of Public Utility Control.110 Connecticut’s creation of DEEP reflects the
State’s position that the preservation of its natural resources is inextricably
intertwined with its energy usage and production. The relative newness of
DEEP, however, has resulted in a slow permit process for anaerobic
101

2011 Conn. Acts 11-80, § 103, 211–12.
About Us: Changing Connecticut for the Greener, supra note 100.
103
Id.
104
Since its inception, “for every $1 of public funds committed by the Green Bank . . . an
additional $6 in private investment occurred in the economy.” Id.; see also CONN. GREEN BANK,
REPORT
2016:
BUILDING
A
STRONGER
CONNECTICUT
5
(2016),
ANNUAL
http://www.ctgreenbank.com/fy16-annual-report/ [https://perma.cc/PV3V-S93Q] (detailing how, in
2016, the Connecticut Green Bank’s public-private partnerships in clean energy projects and programs
created an additional 4,444 jobs).
105
2011 Conn. Acts 11-80, § 103(b), 212 (Reg. Sess.).
106
Id. at § 103(d), 212.
107
Id.
108
2015 Conn. Acts 15-152 2 (Reg. Sess.)
109
Quantum Biopower Unveils Connecticut’s First Food-Waste-to-Energy Facility, QUANTUM
BIOPOWER,
http://www.quantumbiopower.com/about-us-2/news/quantum-biopower-unveilsconnecticuts-first-food-waste-energy-facility/ [https://perma.cc/FGM3-H6KA] (last visited Jan. 10,
2018).
110
2011 Conn. Acts 11-80 1 (Reg. Sess.)
102
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digestion facilities. DEEP has been working to address the regulatory
factors that have burdened or discouraged the development of anaerobic
digestion.112
C. Organics Recycling Mandate Favors Local Businesses
In addition to making financing available through the Connecticut
Green Bank, Connecticut supports anaerobic digestion through Public Act
13-285, a flow-control law governing the recycling of organic materials.113
This law favors in-state businesses in three primary ways.
1. Permit Requirement
Waste generators are permitted to recycle organic materials only “at
any authorized source-separated organic-material composting facility.”114
A “composting facility” is a facility that uses either composting or
anaerobic digestion to process organic materials.115 Connecticut mandates
that composting facilities receiving Connecticut’s organic waste must
obtain permits administered by DEEP’s Bureau of Materials Management
and Compliance Assurance.116 This means that facilities receiving
Connecticut’s waste must be located in Connecticut.
Theoretically, DEEP says that a Connecticut entity could transport its
organic materials to an out-of-state facility, contingent on the facility
meeting basic compliance standards, as determined by DEEP.117 Organic
materials are dense and heavy, so the cost of transporting this waste to a
facility farther than the local Connecticut-based facility would be
expensive, making it unlikely that an entity would use an out-of-state
facility unless that facility were the closer of the two facilities.118

111

See, e.g., Jan Ellen Spiegel, Recycling Food Waste in Connecticut: Slow as Molasses, CT
MIRROR (Apr. 11, 2016), https://ctmirror.org/2016/04/11/recycling-food-waste-in-connecticut-slow-asmolasses/ [https://perma.cc/Y2UP-MHPM] (reporting how Quantum Biopower submitted its permits
for approval in late 2013, and in April 2016, twenty-six months later, it was still waiting to receive
permitting).
112
THE PLAN, supra note 83, at 52–53.
113
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (codifying Public Act 13-285).
114
Id. § (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
115
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-207(29) (2017) (defining “composting facility” as that which
“us[es] a process of accelerated biological decomposition of organic material under controlled aerobic
or anaerobic conditions”).
116
Solid Waste Facility: An Environmental Permitting Fact Sheet, CONN. DEP’T OF ENERGY &
PROT.,
http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2709&q=324200&deepNav_GID=1643
ENVTL.
[https://perma.cc/9U3T-F42N] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
117
Telephone Interview with Sherill Baldwin, Environmental Analyst, Conn. Dep’t of Energy &
Envtl. Prot. (Jan. 8, 2018).
118
Id.
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Proximity Trigger

Connecticut creates a proximity trigger to the mandate by requiring
disposal for waste generators that meet a tonnage threshold and are located
not more than twenty miles from an authorized facility.119 In conjunction
with the permit requirement, this restriction effectively requires that
facilities competing in Connecticut’s market must be located in
Connecticut.120 Otherwise, a facility’s out-of-state location may fail to
trigger the law’s geographic and tonnage requirements for Connecticut
entities. This places in-state anaerobic digestion facilities at a competitive
advantage because only their proximity to a business generating the
tonnage quota can trigger the mandate. Furthermore, as discussed supra
Section C.1, transporting organic materials can be cost prohibitive. This
cost would deter an entity from transporting its waste anywhere except the
state-authorized facility located not more than twenty miles away.
Effectively, therefore, the law requires that entities that fall within the law
send their organic materials to the facilities that Connecticut authorizes.
3.

Tonnage Trigger

Public Act 13-285 guarantees waste flow to authorized facilities
through its waste tonnage requirements for commercial generators.121 Any
commercial food wholesaler or distributer, industrial food manufacturer or
processor, supermarket, resort, or conference center that produces 104 tons
of organic materials each year, or 52 tons per year as of 2020, triggers this
tonnage requirement.122 If a commercial generator triggers the tonnage
requirement and is within twenty miles of an authorized source-separated
composting facility, then it must recycle its organic materials at an
authorized facility—that is, a facility located in Connecticut.123 This
tonnage trigger hoards all organic materials from these businesses for those
facilities that Connecticut authorizes, thereby ensuring that there is product
to sustain those facilities.

119

CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-226e(a)(1)–(2) (2017).
Currently, Connecticut has one operational anaerobic digestion facility, Quantum Biopower;
two facilities under construction; and one planned for construction. Central locations, such as the two
anaerobic digestion facilities in Southington, Connecticut, and sites near cities, like the permitted
facilities in Bridgeport and North Haven, appear most desirable for client acquisition. See Food Waste
Composting
Facilities,
CONN.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY
&
ENVTL.
PROT.,
http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2718&q=325376&deepNav_GID=1645
[https://perma.cc/
MH2V-HJJW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) (identifying the permitted composting and anaerobic
digestion facilities in Connecticut).
121
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-226e(a)(1)–(2) (2017).
122
Id.
123
See Food Waste Composting Facilities, supra note 120 (identifying the permitted composting
and anaerobic digestion facilities in Connecticut).
120
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Much of central and eastern Connecticut remains exempt from the
requirements of Connecticut’s organic waste ban because there are no
approved facilities in those areas.124 Thus, the law cannot hoard the organic
materials in these areas. That said, given the amount of organic materials in
Connecticut’s MSW, these regions are likely landfilling their organic
materials.
In these three ways—the permit requirement, the proximity trigger,
and tonnage trigger—Connecticut’s organic waste ban promotes the
recycling of organic materials by ensuring that in-state, and not out-ofstate, facilities are receiving Connecticut’s organic materials. Connecticut
Green Bank also has promoted its composting facilities by making millions
of dollars in loans available to investors. But in promoting a homegrown
organics recycling market, Connecticut may have run afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.125
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE: STATES SINK OR SWIM
TOGETHER
In the United States Constitution, the Commerce Clause provides that
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”126
The United States Supreme Court has “long interpreted the Commerce
Clause as an implicit restraint on state authority, even in the absence of a
conflicting federal statute.”127 This implicit restraint is referred to as the
“dormant” aspect of the Commerce Clause.128 The Dormant Commerce
Clause protects the belief that “one state in its dealings with another may
not place itself in a position of economic isolation.”129 Instead, the Court
has held that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples
of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”130 This idea of
economic, national unity animates the Dormant Commerce Clause.131
124

Id.
See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (holding that a
flow control ordinance, which requires all solid waste to be processed at a designated transfer station
before leaving the municipality, “is just one more instance of local processing requirements that we
long have held invalid”).
126
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
127
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007).
128
Id.
129
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935).
130
Id. at 523.
131
See, e.g., id. at 527–28 (holding that New York’s Milk Control Act, which prohibited the sale
of milk imported from another state unless it was sold at a set price, was a direct and unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause).
125
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As Part I discusses, when it comes to food waste, the federal
government, by and large, has left the states to swim alone in unchartered
waters.132 There are, though, two United States Supreme Court cases that
deal specifically with the legality of flow control: C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown133 and United Haulers Association, Inc. v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.134 This Part first considers
these two cases and, then, suggests that Connecticut’s Public Act 13-285
looks similar to the ordinance that the Court struck down in Carbone as
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause. Despite this similarity, in the
face of Congress’ inaction in regards to food waste reduction, this Part
argues that there should be deference to state experimentation on this issue
given the important role states play as innovators and protectors of the
environment. In its final Section, this Part provides solutions for how to
save Connecticut’s organic waste ban from running afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
A. Supreme Court Invalidates Local Flow Ordinance
In 1994, in Carbone, the Court invalidated a local flow ordinance on
the grounds that it was facially discriminatory under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.135 The town of Clarkstown, New York had agreed to
close its landfill and a local private contractor had agreed to construct a
private recycling facility, which would revert to municipal ownership after
five years.136 Until that happened, though, the town: (1) guaranteed a
minimum waste flow of 120,000 tons to amortize the costs of the private
facility; and (2) made noncompliance punishable by fine and
imprisonment.137
The Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause analysis considered two
questions. 138 First, did the flow control ordinance discriminate against
interstate commerce? 139 Second, was the burden on interstate commerce
“clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits”?140
132
See Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause,
65 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 425–26 (2013) (arguing that state and local communities are exploring
innovative solutions to society’s modern challenges alone, which will test the contours of the current
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
133
511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
134
550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).
135
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392.
136
Id. at 387.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 390.
139
Id.
140
Id. The Court’s two-tiered analysis applied the analytical framework of the Court’s decision in
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978), where the Court struck down as
unconstitutional a New Jersey ban on the importation of waste from other states. Id.
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The first tier of inquiry, the per se invalid test, subjects a facially
discriminatory regulation to a strict and nondeferential standard of
review.141 A court will apply per se invalid analysis to three different types
of discrimination: (1) where a law facially discriminates by treating
differently in-state and out-of-state economic interests to the economic
advantage of the former; (2) where a facially neutral law was enacted for
the purpose of economic protectionism; and (3) where “a facially neutral
law has obvious discriminatory effects.”142 If a statute passes the per se
invalid analysis, then a court may still find a constitutional violation under
the second tier of inquiry—known as the Pike balancing test—which
inquires whether the “burden [imposed] on interstate commerce . . . is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”143
The Carbone Court concluded that the town’s flow control ordinance
hoarded a local resource by preventing local businesses from sending
already sorted recyclables directly out-of-state for processing, even though
the law equally discriminated against out-of-town and in-state
processors.144 The ordinance, therefore, affected interstate commerce by
prohibiting out-of-state competition and by driving up the costs for out-ofstate interests to dispose of their waste.145 It did not matter that there was
no evidence that out-of-state “firms were economically disadvantaged
compared to in-state firms.”146 It also did not matter that the town cited
both environmental protection and financing measures as legitimate
reasons for its ordinance.147 Because the town had alternative,
nondiscriminatory ways to address its health and environmental problems,
such as enacting safety regulations, the Court found a violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause and never reached the excessive-burden
inquiry.148
The ordinance’s “purpose to distort competition [was] objectionable
precisely because the effect—distortion of competition—is constitutionally
141

Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624 (“Thus, where simple economic protectionism is
effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”).
142
Bradford C. Mank, Are Public Facilities Different from Private Ones?: Adopting a New
Standard of Review for the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 SMU L. REV. 157, 163–64 (2007).
143
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)); see also Anthony L. Moffa & Stephanie L. Safdi, Freedom from the
Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods
Movement Policies, 21 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 344, 363 (2014) (“In practice, this balancing test has
proved unworkable, as the Supreme Court has effectively collapsed both tests into a single screen that
roots out ‘protectionist’ legislation.”).
144
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 390–91 (“With respect to this stream of commerce, the flow control
ordinance discriminates, for it allows only the favored operator to process waste that is within the limits
of the town.”).
145
Id. at 389.
146
Mank, supra note 142, at 176 (citation omitted).
147
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 393.
148
Id. at 386, 393.
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proscribed.”
This kind of local economic protectionism “is per se
invalid, save in a narrow class of cases in which the municipality can
demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance
a legitimate local interest.”150 Under Carbone, a state carries a heavy
burden of proving that its statutory scheme effectuates a legitimate public
interest, particularly because a mere environmental objective on the
grounds of protectionism will not satisfy this requirement.151
The Carbone Court’s prohibition of a town’s local flow control
ordinance reflects a “growth of the [D]ormant [C]ommerce [C]lause” to
extend to environmental and waste disposal practices.152 With this growth,
there has been “a concomitant contraction of the states’ ability to regulate
within the sphere of interstate commercial activity.”153 The Court’s
imposition of “a virtually per se rule of invalidity”154 places state and local
regulations aimed at environmental protection in a vulnerable position,
leading some scholars to argue that “laudable environmental motives or
achievements [could] become irrelevant.”155
B. Publicly Owned Waste Facilities May Favor Local Government
Over a decade later, in United Haulers, the Court narrowed its holding
in Carbone by determining for the first time that public and private entities
should not be regarded “with equal skepticism.”156 United Haulers was
another flow control ordinance case with one salient difference: the laws at
149

Daniel Francis, The Decline of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 94 DENV. U. L. REV. 255, 287
(2017); see also Catherine Gage O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate
Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 580 (1997) (“The
intentional, self-serving nature of a typical protectionist measure is likely to invoke anxiety in other
states and invite hostile, retaliatory measures. In evaluating a state statute for protectionism, the focus
ought to be on whether the state enacted the statute because it intended to isolate itself and/or protect a
segment of its industry from competition on the interstate market.” (internal citation omitted)).
150
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted).
151
C.M.A. McCauliff, The Environment Held in Trust for Future Generations or the Dormant
Commerce Clause Held Hostage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 645, 662
(1995).
152
Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 48–49
(2003).
153
Id. at 48.
154
Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
155
Klein, supra note 152, at 49 (citation omitted); see, e.g., McCauliff, supra note 151, at 683–84
(stating that “the public interest is damaged by too aggressive an extension of the dormant Commerce
Clause”); Andrew D. Thompson, Note, Public Health, Environmental Protection, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Sovereignty in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 213, 216 (2004) (“In its resolve to expose the underlying intent of resource protectionism,
however, the Court has espoused a standard that has been interpreted to invalidate state environmental
laws that pertain significantly to public health.”).
156
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 343
(2007).
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issue required haulers to bring waste to facilities owned and operated by a
state-created public benefit corporation, effectively excluding all other
businesses, foreign and domestic, for competing for the counties’
business.157 For a plurality of the Court, this difference was determinative.
While laws favoring “in-state business over out-of-state competition”
should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, “[l]aws favoring local
government, by contrast, may be directed toward any number of legitimate
goals unrelated to [economic] protectionism.”158 Thus, where waste
regulation is a local government function involving public entities, “[t]he
[D]ormant Commerce Clause is not a roving license” for judicial oversight
and review.159 Instead, democratic processes provide “citizens and
businesses . . . [that] bear the costs of the ordinances” sufficient protection
against discrimination and the more lenient Pike balancing test should be
applied.160 Any incidental burden on interstate commerce that does not
outweigh the benefits conferred by the regulation will likely withstand
scrutiny.161
The Court determined that the waste flow ordinances served sufficient
public benefit by financing the waste disposal services, “increas[ing]
recycling . . . [and] conferring significant health and environmental
benefits upon the citizens of the Counties.”162 The Court further
determined that if the haulers could take waste to any disposal site—and
not the site proscribed under the ordinances—recycling “enforcement
would be much more costly, if not impossible.”163
The Court’s decision in United Haulers, according to Justice Clarence
Thomas, underscores the problem with the Dormant Commerce Clause: it
“has proven unworkable in practice.”164 It has become a vehicle for judicial
activism and, therefore, vulnerable to the Court’s shifting policy
preferences.165 Justice Thomas argued that it is not the Court’s purview to
express, as it does in United Haulers, what can only be “a policy-driven
157

Id. at 334.
Id. at 343.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 345–46 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
161
Id. at 334.
162
Id. at 346–47.
163
Id. at 347.
164
Id. at 349 (Thomas, J., concurring).
165
Id. at 351; see Laura Gabrysch, Note, Constitutional Law—Dormant Commerce Clause—Flow
Control Ordinances That Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility Violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 563, 592 (1995) (“[T]he Carbone decision indicates the Court’s
willingness to make policy judgments which should fall under the domain of the legislature and not that
of the judiciary. The tests used for both levels of Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny allow the
Supreme Court to pit local public concerns against private economic interests. . . . [T]his type of use of
the Dormant Commerce Clause invites those with money and power to attack environmental
regulations by bypassing the legislative process and going straight to the judiciary.” (citations
omitted)).
158
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preference for government monopoly over privatization.” Instead of
being left to the whim of the courts, state and local environmental
regulations should be debated through the legislative process.167
Where there is congressional silence, Justice Thomas is right—states
should be “free to set the balance between protectionism and the free
market.”168 That balance weighs, on the one hand, state sovereignty over
issues involving the environment, health, and safety and, on the other hand,
strong economic national unity that encourages market entry.169 The
Dormant Commerce Clause fails to account for the necessary role states
and localities play in this balancing process as it concerns environmental
regulations.170 A Dormant Commerce Clause that is too aggressively
enforced could stymie “governments’ ability to plan and provide for the
most environmentally sound and economically acceptable solutions”171—
solutions like Connecticut Public Act 13-285.
166

United Haulers Ass’n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the dangers of “leav[ing] the future of state and local
regulation of commerce to the whim of the Federal Judiciary”).
168
Id. at 352.
169
See McCauliff, supra note 151, at 661 (“The Supreme Court’s new concern with
discrimination against interstate commerce by local protectionism emphasizes the role of the market by
encouraging market entry, and consequently, de-emphasizes public interest, governmental functions
and health and safety regulations.” (citation omitted)).
170
One example of how the Dormant Commerce Clause fails to account for the importance of
states’ roles as laboratories of experiment is with the contemporary goods movement, the long-range
transportation of agricultural goods. Long-range transportation results in negative externalities, such as
greenhouse gas emissions, that uniquely impact local communities. A policy that “provides explicit
benefits exclusively to local producers [as a means to reduce the effect of greenhouse gas emissions] is
particularly vulnerable to Dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on imputed protectionist intent.”
Moffa & Safdi, supra note 143, at 397. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey is any indication, “local and global externalities . . . necessitate[] a fundamental
rethinking of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.” Id. at 351. In that case, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, a program designed to address the negative
externalities of the goods movement by assigning carbon intensity scores that treated in-state and outof-state fuels differently based not on the fuel’s origin but its carbon intensity, was not an
extraterritorial regulation in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. See Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013) (“California’s regulatory experiment seeking to
decrease GHG emissions and create a market that recognizes the harmful costs of products with a high
carbon intensity does not facially discriminate against out-of-state ethanol.”), reh’g en banc denied,
740 F.3d 507 (9th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 2875 (2014). Such a rethinking is necessary
because the “Dormant Commerce Clause evisceration of local and state regulations can add to the
disempowerment of communities most affected by goods movement by further removing them from
decision-making processes.” Moffa & Safdi, supra note 143, at 404.
171
Eric S. Petersen & David N. Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow Control in the
Post-Carbone World, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361, 416 (1995); see also Kalen, supra note 132, at 402,
425 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause has “stymied state and local efforts to respond to
emerging problems” as conservative organizations challenge state and local statutes designed to protect
against climate change and that “it is reasonably likely,” therefore, “that the [Dormant Commerce
Clause] will function either as a potential obstacle or a chilling effect on laudable efforts”); Moffa &
Safdi, supra note 143, at 406 (“[I]t is the authors’ hope that Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
will eventually fall by the historical wayside. The principles of cooperative federalism and
167
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C. Public Act 13-285 May Run Afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Connecticut Public Act 13-285 likely would fail the first tier of the
Carbone Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, which considers
whether a flow control ordinance is per se invalid because it discriminates
against interstate commerce.172 If Public Act 13-285 were to survive strict
scrutiny analysis, however, it has a good chance of passing the Pike
balancing test, the Carbone Court’s second tier of analysis.173 Connecticut
could also amend its law to avoid any constitutional challenges.
1. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
When framed as a law that ensures that Connecticut’s composting
facilities have enough organic materials product to support them, Public
Act 13-285 likely provides for the kind of local economic protectionism
that is per se invalid.174 This is because Connecticut’s organic materials
waste ban looks similar to the ordinance struck down in Carbone in that it
requires certain local entities to bring a local resource to a state-mandated
processing facility.175 That the ordinance in Carbone favored only one
local facility, whereas Public Act 13-285 applies to multiple facilities, does
not matter because this fact in Carbone was not determinative; it just made
the ordinance’s protectionist effect all the more acute.176 Moreover, under
Carbone, as long as the law espouses protectionist intent to discriminate
against interstate commerce, there does not necessarily need to be evidence
supporting actual discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.177
Connecticut could make two arguments in its defense. First,
Connecticut could claim that Public Act 13-285 “serves a legitimate local
purpose that could not be served as well by nondiscriminatory means.”178
But “[t]his last-ditch opportunity is largely illusory” with one exception:
Maine v. Taylor.179 In Taylor, the Court upheld the State of Maine’s ban on
environmental justice both suggest that the time has come for the courts to abandon Dormant
Commerce Clause review entirely.”).
172
See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (offering a
two-tiered analysis for Dormant Commerce Clause cases).
173
See id.
174
See id. at 392 (discussing how discrimination against interstate commerce in a way that aims to
protect local businesses is “per se invalid” in all cases except where a municipality can demonstrate
that it has “no other means to advance a legitimate local interest”).
175
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e (2013).
176
See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392 (noting that the fact that the town’s ordinance only favored one
local processing facility only “makes the protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute”).
177
See Mank, supra note 142, at 178 (“The Carbone majority invalidated the flow control
ordinance because it interfered with free access to waste markets, although there was no evidence of
discrimination between in-state and out-of-state firms . . . .”).
178
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356
(2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
179
O’Grady, supra note 149, at 574 n.12.

2018]

CONNECTICUT’S FOOD WASTE PROBLEM

845

the importation of baitfish, as Maine had no other means of preventing a
spread of parasites and an adulteration of its native fish populations.180 The
Court held that Maine was not expected “to sit idly by and wait until
potentially irreversible environmental damage has occurred or until the
scientific community agrees on what disease organisms are or are not
dangerous before it acts to avoid such consequences.”181
Under Taylor, Connecticut would have to identify a specific threat to
the state’s health and safety or to the integrity of its natural resources.182 If
Connecticut were to identify, say, climate change as its threat, analogizing
to Taylor’s tangible threats of parasites and adulteration would be difficult.
The causal relationship between mandating food waste diversion and,
thereby, reducing climate change is far more attenuated than banning the
importation of baitfish and, thereby, eliminating the threat of parasites and
adulteration on native fish populations. Furthermore, to address climate
change, there are a number of alternative, nondiscriminatory means that
Connecticut could implement, such as carbon offset programs or
encouraging more people to bike or carpool to work.183 Therefore, while
Connecticut also should not have to sit idly by and wait until irreversible
environmental damage has occurred because of the high amount of food
waste in its MSW, Connecticut’s law likely would not withstand strict
scrutiny.
Second, Connecticut could distinguish Public Act 13-285 from
Carbone by arguing that its law is not facially discriminatory because outof-state composting facilities can receive Connecticut’s organic materials
since in-state waste generators can send their waste to “any authorized
source-separated organic material composting facility.”184 This argument
could save Public Act 13-285 from being per se invalid. The law’s
twenty-mile proximity trigger, however, may make this distinction
irrelevant. Even if the law authorizes any in-state or out-of-state facility to
receive the state’s organic material, only Connecticut-based facilities can
activate the twenty-mile proximity trigger. And this proximity trigger
effectively discriminates against out-of-state facilities because

180

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 141, 151 (1986).
Id. at 148 (citation omitted).
182
See id. at 151 (“As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt to
‘place itself in a position of economic isolation,’ . . . it retains broad regulatory authority to protect the
health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources.” (citation omitted)).
183
An analysis of Connecticut’s Public Act 13-285 under Taylor using the threat of hunger
similarly fails given that there are a number of alternative ways to combat hunger other than through
the state’s organic materials waste ban.
184
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-226e(a)(1)(B) (2017) (emphasis added).
181

846

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:3

transportation costs of organic materials are cost prohibitive beyond a
certain distance.185
2. Pike Balancing Test
If Public Act 13-285 were to survive strict scrutiny analysis, then, the
question becomes whether it would pass a Pike balancing test. Under this
test, Public Act 13-285 is constitutional if its incidental impact on interstate
commerce is not “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”186 Connecticut could persuasively argue that the law benefits its
communities by (1) providing the organic materials necessary to sustain
the state’s anaerobic digestion facilities; (2) increasing organic materials
recycling and, thereby, reducing food waste in the state’s MSW; and (3)
conferring significant health and environmental benefits to its citizens. As
evidence does not exist that the law actually burdens interstate commerce,
these local, putative benefits would tip the scale in favor of finding Public
Act 13-285 constitutionally valid.
3. Amending Public Act 13-285
While no party has yet to challenge the constitutionality of Public Act
13-285,187 Connecticut could amend its law so that it no longer
discriminates against interstate commerce.
First, albeit an unlikely solution, Connecticut could make its permitted
composting facilities public entities, which would subject them to the more
lenient Pike balancing test under United Haulers.188 Given “local
government’s vital role in waste management,” public facilities would pass
constitutional muster.189
185
See Part II.C.2 (explaining that Connecticut’s requirement that disposal for waste generators
meet a tonnage threshold and be located not more than twenty miles from an authorized facility creates
a proximity trigger and impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce).
186
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
187
Challenging recycling laws might be a bad business move; whereas, studies support that using
green initiatives as a marketing tool is good for business. See, e.g., Dholakiya Pratik, Earth Day
Aspirations: Saving Money While Saving the Environment, BUSINESS.COM (Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.business.com/articles/earth-day-aspirations-saving-money-while-saving-the-environment/
[https://perma.cc/4KU6-A8S6] (“A Nielson study of consumer attitudes across 60 countries found that
55% of consumers worldwide would pay a premium for products offered by eco-friendly and socially
responsible companies. These consumer claims are also backed up by research of actual sales
figures.”); see also Bill 1116, An Act Concerning the Recycling of Organic Materials by Certain Food
Wholesalers, Manufacturers, Supermarkets, & Conference Ctr., 2011 Leg. Sess. May 19, 2011
(statement of Sen. J. Edward Meyer III) (explaining that “there was no business opposition in the
public hearing to this bill [what would become Public Act 11-217, the precursor to Public Act 13-285],
but the bill on its face obviously has some costs to those large generators of organic materials, because
they will be having to bring the—organic materials to the composting facility”).
188
See supra Part III.A (discussing the Pike balancing test in United Haulers).
189
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344
(2007).
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Second, Connecticut could remove the authorization requirement
under the act, thereby, allowing any eligible composting facility in-state or
out-of-state to participate in its market. The downside here is that
Connecticut’s nascent anaerobic digestion facilities may suffer and
Connecticut needs these facilities to meet its 60 percent diversion goal.190
Additionally, the authorization requirement serves an important oversight
function of ensuring that the facilities receiving Connecticut’s organic
materials are efficient and capable. Under this solution, the proximity
trigger may still prove problematic for the reasons discussed above.
Finally, Connecticut could remove the proximity trigger altogether.
The problem, though, with this solution is whether, without the proximity
trigger, the law still would achieve its desired goals of removing food
waste from Connecticut’s MSW while also supporting the state’s anaerobic
digestion market by ensuring that the state’s anaerobic digestion facilities
receive enough product to be financially viable.
CONCLUSION
Food waste contributes to global warming by depleting the nation’s
natural resources and by producing toxic methane gas. In this way, food
waste is undeniably a national problem, but it is also a state and local
problem in need of immediate solutions. Connecticut Public Act 13-285
offers an environmentally sound, innovative solution to Connecticut’s food
waste problem. It is not a solution that will eliminate Connecticut’s food
waste—as the state should implement a more comprehensive organic waste
ban that reaches individual consumers as well as industrial generators—but
it is a start.
Connecticut’s organic waste ban should be heralded as innovative and
necessary; it reduces food waste and harmful methane gas emissions,
promotes Connecticut’s anaerobic digestion industry, and creates green
energy and new job opportunities. Instead, it may be vulnerable to
challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which has the power to
impede critical state and local regulations aimed at environmental
protection—regulations like Connecticut Public Act 13-285. But a rigid
application of the Dormant Commerce Clause that does not show
deference to state experimentation on the issue of food waste reduction
fails to account for the important role states and localities play as
“innovators and guardians of public health and the environment.”191
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